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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ state 
cigarette tax choices, and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975-
2000 data, we find evidence that governors in states with relatively important agricultural 
tobacco production and tobacco manufacturing, and which are densely populated by smokers, 
appear prone to reputation-building. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state 
cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.  
 
Keywords: Agricultural tobacco, cigarette taxation, lobbying, reputation-building; electoral 
accountability; term limits; federalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in the United States. A direct contributor 
to this massive health burden is the effectiveness of the tobacco industry’s activities, including 
campaign contributions.” 
 
- D.A. Luke and M. Krauss, in “Where There’s Smoke There’s Money: Tobacco 
Industry Campaign Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting,” American Journal 
of Preventive Medicine 27(5): 363-72, 2002 (p. 363). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In representative democracies, elections are the voters’ tool for making incumbent politicians 
pay attention to their constituents’ interests. While in office, politicians attempt to build a 
reputation that can help them get reelected with votes (Besley and Case, 1995, 2003; List and 
Sturm, 2006) and campaign contributions (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). However, when 
reelection is no longer possible due to a binding term limit, voters lose their main tool for 
holding the politician accountable, and interest groups can no longer count on future help.  
 The literature studying political reputation-building behavior by politicians has recently 
documented how state fiscal and environmental policies are used to attract certain voter groups 
to governors’ platforms (Besley and Case 2003; List and Sturm 2006). List and Sturm (2006) 
present a two-policy model where a politician sets both “primary policies” (e.g., government 
spending or the extent of wealth redistribution) and “secondary policies” (e.g., environmental 
policy or trade policy). Their model predicts that if the secondary policy is some voters’ main 
priority, politicians may distort the secondary policy to attract such “single-issue voters.” The 
state cigarette tax is (in our view) an example of a secondary policy, and this is the policy focus 
in the current paper. Taxation of tobacco products is a relatively important issue in the U.S. For 
example, in 1997 U.S. tobacco farmers sold tobacco leaf valued at $2.9bn, U.S. consumers spent 
$52.6bn on tobacco products (out of which $5.7bn was federal taxes, and $7.8bn was state and 
local taxes), and 1 to 2 million jobs are supported by the tobacco industry (farming, 
manufacturing, wholesale, and retailing), according to Gale et al. (2000). Uri and Boyd (1995) 
find that a $1 per pack equivalent increase in the excise tax on tobacco products could cause a 
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fall in the consumption of all goods and services in the U.S. by approximately 0.49 percent, a fall 
in tobacco consumption by more than 12 percent, a decline in total utility by almost 0.5 percent, 
and a net increase of government revenue by more than 1.7 percent.1 Various voter and interest 
groups have intense preferences over state cigarette taxes. These groups include cigarette 
smokers, but also factor owner lobby groups and workers in agricultural tobacco production and 
in the cigarette (tobacco products) manufacturing industry. These groups all favor lower cigarette 
taxes.2 On the other hand, anti-smoking groups favor higher cigarette taxes. 
Electoral incentives are not the only consideration of politicians, however. In addition to 
votes, politicians care about financial contributions from special interest groups. For example, 
Glantz and Begay (1994), Goldstein and Bearman (1996), Morley et al. (2002), and Luke and 
Krauss (2002) all argue that lobbying is an important influence on policy in the area of state 
cigarette taxation.3 In this paper, we rely on the theoretical framework developed by Kroszner 
and Stratmann (1998), who argue that politicians build a reputation with various lobby groups. 
Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) argue that over time, as a politician’s credibility rises as a 
champion of a particular group’s interest, the politician will be supported with larger amounts of 
campaign contributions by groups close in ideology. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) also suggest 
that as the probability rises that the politician leaves office, the level of contributions will 
decline.4  Since a lame duck governor has a probability equal to unity of leaving office, it 
                                                
1 Moreover, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an estimated 19.8 percent of U.S. adults 
(43.4 million), were smokers in 2007, and during 2001–2004 the average annual smoking-attributable health care 
expenditures and productivity losses were approximately $193 billion per year  
(see http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2008/r081113.htm, visited July 7, 2009). 
2 However, if a share of output is sold out of state, these workers would have less at stake in the cigarette tax policy 
outcome. 
3 For example, Glantz and Begay (1994) find that tobacco industry campaign contributions influence California state 
legislators on matters related to tobacco policies, independent of constituents’ support for tobacco control measures. 
Lopez and Pagoulatos (1996) argue that campaign contributions have a “strongly persuasive role” (p. 237) for U.S. 
tobacco trade protection, while Lopez (2001) find that campaign contributions from the farm lobby yields high 
returns in the form of substantial agricultural subsidies, and Lopez and Matschke (2006) and Ederington and Minier 
(2008) report that campaign contributions are highly influential for trade barriers in the U.S. food-processing 
industries and in the agricultural commodities sectors, respectively. 
4 Evidence appears to support this conclusion. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) find that PAC contributions dried up 
almost completely for U.S. House Banking Committee members who announced their retirement. 
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follows that contributions given to such governors should decline sharply. In the area of tobacco, 
lobbying is carried out both by tobacco farmers, the tobacco manufacturing industry, and by anti-
smoking groups.5 Our first objective in this paper is to study whether U.S. governors use 
cigarette taxes to (i) build reputation among voters with a strong interest in the tax rate, and/or 
(ii) build reputation among agricultural and manufacturing lobby groups with a large stake in 
cigarette taxation.  
Anecdotal evidence indeed indicates that governors use cigarette taxes to build reputation 
and gain re-election, and then raise this tax during the lame duck term. For example, in his lame 
duck term Gov. Parris N. Glendening (D) of Maryland pushed through a 30 cents/pack state 
cigarette tax (to 66 cents per pack, effective July 1, 1999). His predecessor Gov. William D. 
Schaefer (D) had then already raised this tax twice in 1991 and 1992, while in lame duck status.6 
In our analysis of reputation building, we also contribute by incorporating insights from 
the literature on fiscal federalism: policies set by one level of government have been found to 
influence the policies set by the government at another level. We therefore believe the results 
from the literature on vertical tax interactions should be taken into consideration in empirical 
studies of state cigarette taxation. This literature establishes that states set taxes (e.g., cigarette, 
gasoline, income, and corporate taxes) conditional on the federal cigarette tax rate (see, e.g., 
Besley and Rosen, 1998; Devereux et al., 2007).7 This suggests that governors may take the 
federal tax rate into consideration also when engaging in reputation building activities. Our 
                                                
5 Morley et al. (2002) report that spending by the Tobacco Institute (an anti-tax tobacco industry lobby group) 
increased significantly in Ohio in 1991-92 preceding the 1993 cigarette tax of 6 cents per pack; spending in Utah 
and Washington State rose sharply in 1995-96 during which time their state cigarette taxes however increased 
significantly. Goldstein and Bearman (1996) report that in year 1994 there were 450 state level pro-tobacco lobbyist, 
but only 16 lobbyists primarily working to reduce tobacco consumption. 
6 Other examples include Gov. Michael N. Castle (R) who raised the Delaware cigarette tax to 24 cents during his 
lame duck term in 1991, and lame duck Gov. John G. Rowland (R) who oversaw a 40 cent increase in 2003 of the 
Connecticut state cigarette tax (to $1.51 per pack). It is or relevance for this paper that in 2004, Gov. Rowland 
resigned from office (under the threat of impeachment), and in 2005 was sentenced to one year and one day in 
prison on corruption charges. Thus, governors do not appear immune from influence-seeking individuals and/or 
groups. 
7 E.g., Besley and Rosen (1998) find that a higher federal cigarette tax is associated with higher state cigarette taxes. 
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second objective is to investigate whether reputation building in the area of cigarette taxation is 
conditional on the federal cigarette tax rate.  
In year 2000, 17 states had positive amounts of agricultural tobacco production, while 18 
states had cigarette manufacturing located within their borders. This makes cigarette taxation a 
suitable policy to study reputation building, as state politicians may be expected to be especially 
likely to build relationships and reputation among tobacco (agricultural and manufacturing) 
lobby groups in states with tobacco related economic activity. Our empirical results appear to 
confirm this view. Utilizing state-level panel data for 1975-2000, we find that reputation building 
occurs by governors, as indicated by a temporal difference in tax rates when they reach lame 
duck status. In particular, such reputation building is conditional on: (i) the share of smoking 
voters in the state; and in particular, (ii) the amount of agricultural tobacco production in the 
state [indicating agricultural tobacco sector lobbying, see Potters and Sloof (1996)]; and (iii) the 
amount of cigarette manufacturing in the state [indicating manufacturing tobacco sector 
lobbying, see Potters and Sloof (1996)]. A lame duck governor raises the state cigarette tax, in 
particular if the state has a high concentration of agricultural tobacco production, 
cigarette/tobacco manufacturing, and/or smoking voters. Thus, not only do voters hold governors 
accountable as shown by List and Sturm (2006), but reputation building is also related to lobby 
group activity, as suggested by Kroszner and Stratmann (1998). Moreover, the policy effects of 
these reputation building activities are conditional on the federal cigarette tax. Lame duck 
governors raise the state cigarette tax by more, the lower the federal cigarette tax. We believe our 
empirical results complement existing findings in the literature. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II further outlines the theoretical predictions 
provided by the literature, and gives a brief overview of the existing empirical literature. Section 
III discusses the empirical model and data. Section IV presents the results, and Section V 
concludes. 
 5
II. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
Theoretical Predictions 
Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) argue that politicians seek to build up a favorable 
reputation with lobby groups through repeated interactions over time.8 As time passes, a 
politician’s credibility rises with a particular interest group due, e.g., to a consistent voting record 
and high effort level on behalf of the group(s) (e.g., by drafting bills, negotiating with legislators, 
giving media interviews, or by meeting and persuading voters). This reduces uncertainty for the 
lobby groups regarding policy outcomes (see also Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989). As time 
progresses, the politician increasingly receives support only from groups close in ideology and 
policy preferences. The amounts of campaign contributions received increase due to the 
reputation building activities. However, these funds disappear when the politician faces a certain 
eviction from office. Consistent with the findings by Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), we assume 
that a lame duck governor receives lower amounts of campaign contributions by the agricultural 
tobacco and cigarette manufacturing lobbies. Thus, the term-limited politician has a lower 
incentive to set a cigarette tax that deviates from her most-preferred policy. 
List and Sturm (2006) present a two-policy model where a politician sets both a frontline 
policy and a secondary policy. Voters have heterogeneous preferences over policies. While most 
voters have no preferences over the secondary policy, for some voters the secondary policy is of 
greater importance than the frontline policy. There is uncertainty regarding the politician’s 
preferences over the secondary policy. The model predicts that if the secondary policy is some 
voters’ main priority, politicians may distort the secondary policy to attract “single-issue voters.” 
An increase in the number of voters that can be attracted by distorting the secondary policy raises 
                                                
8 An extensive theoretical literature on lobbying predicts that politicians distort policy in exchange for campaign 
contributions. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) focus on explaining the organization of the U.S. Congress into 
committees. Grossman and Helpman (1994) develop a seminal menu auction model where campaign contributions 
are exchanged for more favorable trade policies. The findings in this literature suggest that tobacco manufacturing 
industry and agricultural tobacco sector lobbying will have a negative effect on state cigarette tax rates. 
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the probability that incumbent governors engage in reputation-building activities.9 In 
equilibrium, even politicians with views opposite to the single-issue voters may seek to placate 
this voter group by distorting their policy choice in order to win re-election. However, when 
politicians face a binding term limit they set their preferred policies rather than strategically 
distorting policies, since gaining votes and re-election are no longer considerations (consistent 
with, e.g., Alesina, 1988). This view is supported empirically by Besley and Case (1995) who 
report that lame duck governors do not appear to care for either their own or their party’s 
reputation, as evidenced by the finding that only re-electable governors respond to natural 
disasters by raising expenditures. Thus, we expect re-electable governors to attract smokers to 
their platform by lowering the cigarette tax, but to raise this tax as they gain lame duck status. 
Besley and Case (1995) provide a model where voters with imperfect information re-elect 
a governor with a higher probability, the greater the incumbent’s effort (which yields more 
“successful” policies and high voter utility) and reputation (see also Barro, 1970; Banks and 
Sundaram, 1998). In the governor’s final term she finds herself a lame duck without re-election 
prospects, with no payoff from building reputation. Thus, she puts in less effort and her policy 
choices differ from earlier periods, consistent with List and Sturm (2006).10 
The theoretical literature on vertical tax interactions identifies a multitude of opposing 
and ambiguous effects of a federal tax on state commodity taxes. The impact of the federal tax 
rate depends on the price-elasticity of demand, revenue effects, the extent of cross-border 
shopping, and on the degree of horizontal tax competition (see, e.g., Besley and Rosen 1998; 
Keen 1998; Devereux et al. 2007).11 It follows that governors are likely to take the federal tax 
                                                
9 List and Sturm (2006) argue that the pressure to attract these voters also depends on the electoral pressures faced 
by the politician (reflected by the vote margin). This aspect is not a focus of the present paper, and thus we abstract 
from this issue in our empirical analysis. 
10 See Dick and Lott (1993) and Bernhardt et al. (2004) for additional theoretical contributions. 
11 Devereux et al. (2007) argue that the price-elasticity of demand (the elasticity of the tax base) is an important 
determinant of the sign of the tax reaction function. With price-inelastic individual demand and a high incentive to 
undertake inter-state shopping, the federal tax will not matter for the state tax; Devereux et al. (2007) argue that 
these conditions match the U.S. market for cigarettes (when demand instead is elastic, the response is ambiguous). 
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rate into account when building reputation, as the cost of acquiring a reputation (and distorting 
state tax policy) will depend on the federal tax. Moreover, it appears probable that state 
legislatures’ willingness to change state taxes (or not) is conditional on the corresponding federal 
tax, as the marginal effect of, e.g., a state tax increase is influenced by existing taxes levied by 
other levels of government.  
Empirical Literature 
The related empirical literatures contain a multitude of results. Kroszner and Stratmann 
(1998) find that older U.S. House representatives and those who announce their retirement (from 
the Banking Committee) face declining PAC contributions, as they can no longer benefit from 
the reputation they have built with lobby groups. The empirical literature on the impact of 
reputation-building on tax policy includes the important contribution by Besley and Case (1995), 
who find that Democratic lame duck governors set significantly higher per capita total state taxes 
and state expenditures than other governors. Millimet et al. (2004) report that Republican lame 
ducks raise taxes and spending per capita more than do Democratic lame ducks.12 List and Sturm 
(2006) establish that governors’ environmental policy (the secondary policy) choices change 
notably once they obtain lame duck status, and the change is conditional on the environmental 
preferences of the electorate.  
In the empirical literature on vertical tax interactions reports diverging results, Besley and 
Rosen (1998) (using 1975-89 data) and Devereux et al. (2007) (using 1977-97 data) find some 
                                                                                                                                                          
On the other hand, when price-elastic individual demand and little reason exists for inter-state shopping, the federal 
tax affects the state tax negatively when demand is linear, but positively if demand is iso-elastic. Besley and Rosen 
(1998) argue that a revenue effect arises from the need of states to raise tax rates in order to keep state revenues 
intact as the federal tax rises. This suggests that state and federal taxes should be positively associated. Besley and 
Rosen (1998) and Keen (1998) in addition argue that a higher federal tax increases the marginal value of state public 
goods, raising the attractiveness of the state tax. Keen (1998) suggests that a higher federal tax raises the consumer 
price and thus reduces demand for the good. Consequently, the welfare loss resulting from the state tax declines, 
yielding a positive effect on the state tax. Besley and Rosen (1998) argue that endogenous expenditure effects may 
induce states to reduce public spending in response to a higher federal tax, yielding an ambiguous link between 
federal and state taxes. Moreover, Besley and Rosen (1998) suggest that there could be substitutability and 
complementarity effects among various taxes in the presence of non–separabilities in demand, implying an 
ambiguous response by states.  
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12 Besley and Case (2003) extend the data set to 1997 and find a significant effect only for state expenditures. 
Millimet et al. (2004) extend the same sample to 1999, and report stronger positive effects than the earlier literature.  
positive effects on U.S. state cigarette and gasoline taxes of an increase in the corresponding 
federal excise tax.13 This literature has not previously been incorporated in studies of reputation-
building, and has not discussed such issues in the area of agricultural sector policy making.   
III. Empirical Analysis 
The Empirical Model 
Drawing on the existing theories and empirical results discussed above, we distill three 
empirically testable implications. First, in states with more active agricultural tobacco and 
cigarette manufacturing lobby groups (with more at stake, as discussed by Potters and Sloof, 
1996) and thus more intense reputation building by governors, we should see a sharper temporal 
difference in the state cigarette tax as governors reach lame duck status. Second, the temporal 
difference in the cigarette tax when a governor is re-electable versus a lame duck should depend 
on the fraction of voters with a relatively intense interest in the cigarette tax rate, reflected by the 
share of voters classified as smokers. The larger is this set of voters, the greater is the incentive 
of governors to build reputation with the help of cigarette taxes, by moving away from her bliss-
point policy. Finally, if state cigarette taxes are set conditional on the federal cigarette tax, 
reputation building behavior should also be conditional on the federal cigarette tax. Thus, we 
evaluate whether the temporal difference in the cigarette tax set by a re-electable and a lame 
duck governor may be conditional on the federal cigarette tax. The following empirical model is 
estimated:  
,ititti
f
titiit
f
tit
f
titi
s
it ZXStlSltltlt εϕτθδργβα +++××+×+×+++=  (1) 
 
                                                
13 On the other hand, Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) report a negative vertical cigarette tax externality for the 
shorter time span 1982-2001. This literature has also explored other areas of taxation. Boadway and Hayashi (2001) 
and Karkalakos and Kotsogiannis (2007) report negative effects on Canadian provincial corporate taxes, and 
Goodspeed (2000) finds a negative effect on U.S. state income taxes of federal income tax changes. Esteller–Moré 
and Solé–Ollé (2001, 2002) establish a positive impact on U.S. state taxes of federal personal income and general 
sales taxes, and for Canadian income taxes, whereas Brülhart and Jametti (2006) find a positive vertical externality 
on Swiss personal and corporate sub–national taxes.  
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where  is the real cigarette tax rate in state i in year t, sitt iα is a state fixed effect,  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the governor in state  has lame duck status in year t,  is the real 
federal cigarette tax in year t, Si is a dummy variable equal to one if state i  meets a tobacco-
related criteria (explained below), ,  and  are the corresponding 
interaction variables,  are the time varying controls common to all states, are the time and 
state varying controls, and it
itl
f
tti
itlit
f
t lt × iS× iftit Stl ××
tX itZ
ε   is a random error term. The coefficients of interest are ,β  ρ, δ 
and θ.  
Data and Hypothesis Specification 
Our 1975-2000 panel data covers the 48 contiguous U.S. states. All sources, variable 
definitions, and summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The state and federal cigarette excise 
tax rates (per pack of 20 cigarettes) come from Orzechowski and Walker (2003) and are deflated 
to 1983 constant prices. The state tax rates (STATETAX) vary considerably across states and 
time. For example, during 1975 – 2000 the average real state cigarette tax was $0.025 in 
Virginia, while it was $0.38 in Washington. The nominal state cigarette tax rate increased in 
most states during this time period, although not in every state. The federal tax rate (FEDTAX) is 
(of course) identical for all states in any given year. The nominal federal tax rate was 8 cents per 
pack from year 1952 to 1982, but after several tax hikes it had increased to 34 cents by year 
2000. Fig. 1 presents the pattern of real cigarette tax rates over the sample period for: (i) the three 
states with greatest real increases (CA, NY, and WA); (ii) the three states with the greatest real 
declines (KY, NC, and VA); and the real federal tax rate.  
Data on gubernatorial term limits come from List and Sturm (2006). LAMEDUCK takes a 
value of one in years where the incumbent governor is facing a binding term limit, and zero 
otherwise.  In many U.S. states governors face term limits after two terms in office. However, 
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one term, three terms, and no term limits also existed during our sample period. Table A1 in the 
appendix describes this pattern across states during the sample period.  
Data on the share of the population who are smokers come from the State Tobacco 
Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) System of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (various years).  Since the relative size of the smoking population across years is 
highly correlated within states, we use an average of smokers across years 1975-2000 to create 
the dummy variable SMOKER STATE, which takes a value of unity in states heavily populated 
by smokers, and zero otherwise. While an average of 23.8% of the population in the United 
States are classified as smokers during the sample period, 31% of the inhabitants of Kentucky are 
smokers (highest frequency). While we do not have data on the number of anti-smoking 
proponents with preferences sufficiently intense to take them into account at the voting booth, 
we believe they are relatively few.14  
We also create dummy variables based on the average state agricultural tobacco 
production in pounds per $ million real GSP (TOBAC STATE), and the average percentage of 
real GSP coming from the tobacco (cigarettes and other tobacco products) manufacturing sector 
(MANUF STATE) (both variables are averages for years 1975 – 2000). These variables represent 
the lobbying impact of the agricultural tobacco lobby and the tobacco manufacturing industry 
lobby, respectively. With local production activity, lobbying influence is likely to be stronger, 
since more is at stake for the industry in such states (see, e.g., Potters and Sloof, 1996). 
According to Jacobson et al. (1997), the tobacco industry wields its strongest influence at the 
state level. See Table A2 in the appendix for information about exact cut-off values and states. 
Data on agricultural tobacco production comes from USDA (various years); and data on 
                                                
14 Moreover, analogously to List and Sturm’s (2006) argument for “green” and “brown” voters, our measure of 
smokers may yield an account also for this group. This would be a valid approach to proxy the relative political 
strength of smokers and anti-smoker activists in each state, if these voters are uncorrelated or negatively correlated. 
Our empirical findings below appear to suggest that this assumption is reasonable. 
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tobacco/cigarette manufacturing comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department 
of Commerce (various years)).  
We utilize similar control variables as Besley and Rosen (1998). In order to control for 
political party dominance, we use (i) a dummy variable equal to one if the state governor is a 
Democrat (DEMOGOV), (ii) the proportion of Democrats in the state Senate (DEMOSENATE), 
and (iii) the proportion of Democrats in the state House (DEMOHOUSE). Note that Nebraska 
has a non-partisan, unicameral legislature due to the unicameral system of the state legislature. 
We therefore drop Nebraska completely from our data set, following, e.g., Reed (2006). The 
state governor data comes from the National Governors Association (2005), while the 
proportions of Democrats in the Senate and the House come from various editions of the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau (various years)).  
National real GDP (NatlGDP) and the national unemployment rate (NatlUNEMPLOY) 
capture fluctuations in the national economic climate. These variables represent the  controls 
in Eqn. (1). The time- and state-varying controls Zit in Eqn. (1) consist of state demographic and 
economic variables such as the total state population (POPULATION), real state income per 
capita (INCOME), state unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYstate), the portion of population in the 
state between five and 17 years of age (CHILD), and over 65 years old (OVER65).
tX
15 The 
national real GDP, population, and state income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(U.S. Department of Commerce (various years)), and the state unemployment rates are from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor (various years)). The data on the national 
unemployment rate and the proportion of children and those aged above 65 in the population, 
respectively, are from various editions of the Statistical Abstracts of the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau (various years)).  
                                                
15 All models also include POPULATION and INCOME squared, as well as a time trend and its square.  
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Next, TOBACCO INCOME equals tobacco production (lbs) per dollar of state income, 
and comes from USDA (various years); it measures the relative importance of tobacco for the 
state. In addition, GAS measures gasoline production per dollar of state income. Tobacco 
producers may be expected to lobby for lower cigarette taxes, while gasoline producers should 
take the opposite stance (attempting to reduce the need to raise gas tax revenue). GRANTS is 
federal grants/capita, which reduces the need to raise state tax revenues. INCOME TAX is the 
federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income, which seeks to capture the ability of states 
to engage in further taxation effort. The daily gasoline production data comes from the U.S. 
Department of Energy (various years) database, whereas federal grant and income tax data 
comes from the U.S. Census Bureau (various years).  
IV. Empirical Results 
Tables 2 – 4 present our fixed-effects models. As shown by Moulton (1986), OLS estimations 
may give spurious results if the dependent variable is at the individual level and one or more of 
the independent variables are at the aggregate level. Thus, we utilize White (1980) robust 
standard errors and allow for within year correlations.16 We also report the joint significant tests 
for LAMEDUCK and its interactions with FEDTAX, SMOKER STATE, TOBAC STATE, and 
MANUF STATE, respectively. For all models in Tables 2 – 4, R2 fluctuates closely around 0.35 
(not reported). 
Basic Model Results  
Models I-III in Table 2 present results for our measure of the share of voters most likely 
making a lower state cigarette tax a high priority (SMOKER STATE), with three classifications 
based on different cutoff levels (see Table A2). Our classification of SMOKER STATE varies 
between cutoffs at seven states (at least 26.36% of the population are smokers) and 13 states (at 
                                                
16 We calculate the variance of the estimators by allowing within-year correlations. This affects the estimated 
standard errors and the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, but not the estimated coefficients (for detailed 
discussions, see Rogers 1993; Wooldridge 2002).  
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least 25% of the population are smokers).17 Models IV-IX in Table 2 report results using our two 
measures of interest group lobbying intensity; the classification of TOBAC STATE varies 
between cutoffs at 6 states (at least 500 lbs agricultural tobacco production per real GSP) and 17 
states (positive amount of agricultural tobacco production). The classification of MANUF STATE 
varies between cutoffs at 6 states (at least 0.1% of real GSP comes from tobacco manufacturing) 
and 18 states (positive amount of tobacco manufacturing). See Table A2 in appendix for further 
details.  
 In Table 2, 39 out of the 45 reported coefficients are significant, with signs highly 
consistent across models. The models in Table 2 suggest that once a governor obtains lame duck 
status and is no longer accountable to voters or lobby groups, her preferences change regarding 
cigarette taxes. Moreover, the altered behavior is conditional on the existence of tobacco-related 
activities in the governor’s state, and on the federal cigarette tax in effect. As a benchmark case, 
let us first turn to governor behavior in states not classified as SMOKER STATE, TOBAC STATE, 
or MANUF STATE. Model I indicates that, at the mean of FEDTAX, a lame duck located in such 
a state raises STATETAX by (4.90-0.32×13.94) = 0.44 cents. This suggests that the average re-
electable governor builds reputation by keeping state cigarette taxes low (assuming FEDTAX is 
at its mean), but raises the tax upon gaining lame duck status (when relieved of electoral 
accountability). Moreover, she raises STATE TAX further (by 1.22 cents) if FEDTAX is 1 std.dev. 
below its mean (1 std.dev. = 2.44). However, Model I suggests that at one std.dev. above the 
mean of FEDTAX she would lower STATETAX by 0.34 cents. Thus, lame duck behavior is 
conditional on the federal tax and it appears economically relevant, as it may even reverse the 
direction of lame ducks’ tax changes. Models II and III yield similar results. 
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17 The “standard controls” included in all models in Tables 2 – 4 are: DEMOGOV, DEMOSENATE, DEMOHOUSE, 
NatlGDP, NatlUNEMPLOY, POPULATION, INCOME, StateUNEMPLOY, CHILD, OVER65, TOBACCO 
INCOME, GAS, GRANTS, and INCOME TAX, square terms for POPULATION and INCOME, a constant, and a time 
trend and its square (results available upon request). 
Why is lame duck behavior conditional on the federal tax? Besley and Rosen (1998) 
argue that states raise tax rates in order to keep state revenues intact when the federal tax is high; 
Keen (1998) suggests that a higher federal tax raises the consumer price and reduces demand 
with the consequence that the welfare loss resulting from the state tax declines; and both Besley 
and Rosen (1998) and Keen (1998) argue that a higher federal tax increases the marginal value of 
state public goods, raising the attractiveness of the state tax. These effects cause re-electable 
governors to raise (lower) the state tax when the federal tax is high (low) (for welfare reasons, in 
order to win re-election) above (below) their preferred level, ceteris paribus. Lame ducks are less 
guided by welfare considerations and set a tax in accordance with her preferences (as argued by 
Alesina 1988). Lame ducks may also encounter greater political resistance to tax hikes from 
lobby groups and (lobbied) state legislators, the higher the federal tax rate. If the drop in political 
contributions from tobacco-related lobby groups to lame duck politicians (as argued by Kroszner 
and Stratmann, 1998) is less sharp when FEDTAX is high, lame ducks have a greater incentive to 
keep STATETAX low. 
Next, we turn to the behavior of governors in states classified as SMOKER STATE. As an 
example, Model I suggests that at the mean of FEDTAX, a lame duck holding office in such a 
state raises STATETAX by 0.14 cents [(4.90+3.74-(0.32+0.29)×13.94)=0.14]. However, if 
FEDTAX is one std.dev. below the mean in a SMOKER STATE, a lame duck raises STATETAX 
by 1.63 cents, while at one std.dev. above the mean of FEDTAX a lame duck lowers STATETAX 
by 1.35 cents. Model I indicates that the SMOKER STATE classification on average appears to 
yield a relatively low level of reputation building (as evidenced by the small effect of 
LAMEDUCK on STATETAX). However, FEDTAX does influence lame duck behavior in 
SMOKER STATE states; the change in STATETAX is relatively sharper in such states than in 
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states without tobacco-related classification.18 While tobacco producers clearly are negatively 
affected by federal cigarette taxes, our results indicate that producers indirectly benefit from the 
influence of smokers on state taxes, in particular when the federal tax is relatively high.  
 Turning to Models IV-VI, we find evidence that lobbying by agricultural tobacco 
interests have a similar (but greater, on average) effect on lame duck governor behavior as 
smoking voters. For example, Model V suggests that at the mean of FEDTAX a lame duck 
governor in a TOBAC STATE raises STATETAX by 0.96 cents, while at one std.dev. below the 
mean the hike equals 2.55 cents; at one std.dev above the mean, she lowers it by 0.63 cents.19 
This suggests that agricultural tobacco lobbying interests are relatively influential in the 
determination of state cigarette taxes, and governors build a reputation among these interest 
groups. A similar behavior is again detected in states classified as MANUF STATE (see Models 
VII-IX). Model VIII implies that at the mean of FEDTAX a lame duck raises STATETAX by 0.73 
cents, while at one std.dev. below (above) the mean she raises (cuts) it by 2.61 cents (1.15 cents).  
Our results suggest that governors engage in reputation building activities aimed at voters 
and tobacco lobby groups. Moreover, the degree to which voters and lobby groups hold 
governors accountable is conditional on federal tax policy. If the federal tax is relatively low, 
reputation building appears more accentuated. Lame ducks may face less resistance to tax hikes 
from the state legislature and other interests with sway over cigarette taxes when the federal tax 
is relatively low. On the other hand, if high federal taxes are in place, lame duck governors may 
be pressured to lower the state tax, as agricultural and manufacturing tobacco special interests 
continue to lobby to a greater extent when the federal tax takes more of a bite. Moreover, 
revenues, tax welfare losses, and the marginal value of public goods may play a role (Besley and 
Rosen, 1998; Keen, 1998).  
                                                
18 Model II suggests at the mean of FEDTAX, a lame duck holding office in a state classified as SMOKER STATE 
raises STATETAX by 0.49 cents, but at a FEDTAX one std.dev. above the mean she lowers it by 0.85 cents. 
19 The corresponding results using Model VI are increases by 0.18 cents and 1.79 cents, and a cut by 1.43 cents, 
respectively. 
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Robustness Analysis 
Tables 3 and 4 offer robustness analysis (no controls reported; available upon request). 
The three panels in Table 3 present results using the middle-case cut-offs for the classifications 
as SMOKER STATE (10 states), TOBAC STATE (13 states), and MANUF STATE (13 states), 
respectively (remaining cases available upon request). In Model I in Table 3, FEDTAX is 
instrumented by the federal deficit as a percentage of national GDP and national unemployment 
following Besley and Rosen (1998) and Devereux et al. (2007). The state and federal cigarette 
tax rates may simultaneously be affected by some common factor, which might motivate federal 
and state governments to act simultaneously. For example, new information may become 
available on the adverse health effects of smoking. Moreover, the federal government may also 
be influenced by state governments’ tax changes.  
In Model II in Table 3, FEDTAX is allowed to affect STATETAX with a one year lag 
(FEDTAX-1). State legislatures may react with a delay to federal legislative action, or state 
legislation may be implemented with a lag. Model III includes only states without any changes in 
the term limit legislation, as such changes may be simultaneously determined (Besley and Case 
1995). Model IV includes only states having term limit legislation at some point during the 
sample period (see List and Sturm 2006), which forces us to drop 11 states (see Table A1 in the 
appendix). Model V adds NEIGHBORTAX, which controls for horizontal tax interactions (see 
Brueckner 2003; Devereux et al. 2007). We utilize the population weighted tax set by 
neighboring states, instrumented by the population weighted state unemployment rate, the 
percentage of children and old in the population, and the proportion of Democrats in the state 
House, following Rork (2003) (see also Devereux et al. 2007). Model VI includes a lagged 
dependent variable, STATETAXt–1, which is likely to be appropriate if state taxes exhibit strong 
serial correlation (Devereux et al. 2007). STATETAXt–1 is instrumented by the second lag of the 
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dependent variable.20 Model VII includes BEERTAX from the World Tax Data Base (2006); it 
adjusts for another sin tax. Model VIII includes DEFICIT-1, which is the lagged (one year) state 
budget deficit as a percent of real gross state product (GSP). See the table notes for further 
details. Table 4 provides a fixed-effects analysis using several different combinations of the state 
classifications discussed above, using various cut-off levels. 
Results of Robustness Analysis  
The robustness results reported in the three panels in Table 3 show a considerable degree 
of robustness, in our view. LAMEDUCK and FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK are positive and 
significant in 16 and 17 out of the 24 models, respectively. Among the three state-classification 
variables, the two interactions with MANUF STATE are significant most frequently (14 out of 16 
coefficients), while the SMOKER STATE interactions coefficients exhibit significance in seven 
out of 16 instances, and the TOBAC STATE interactions are significant in eleven out of 16 
coefficients. Notably, the IV estimations in Model I appear to suggest that reputation building 
using state cigarette taxation is particularly prevalent in states with tobacco manufacturing 
industry (MANUF STATE states), and again that lame duck behavior is conditional on FEDTAX. 
Model I suggests that in MANUF STATE states, a lame duck raises STATETAX by 1.16 cents at 
the mean of FEDTAX. However, at one std.dev. above (below) the mean of FEDTAX, 
STATETAX falls (rises) by 8.8 cents (6.5 cents) when a lame duck is in office. This result is 
consistent with earlier results; a relatively low FEDTAX facilitates lame ducks’ tax hikes, while a 
high FEDTAX pushes lame ducks to lower the state cigarette tax in states with a high 
concentration of tobacco manufacturing activity. Models II and III yield similar results. 
Using data only from states with term limit legislation in Model IV, or incorporating 
horizontal tax interactions in Model V, suggest that reputation building may be particularly 
strong in the TOBAC STATE and MANUF STATE categories (the interactions with these lobby 
                                                
20 Models I, V and VI of Table 3 pass all the standard tests for validity of the instruments (results available upon 
request). 
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group indictor variables are significant in these models, but not for SMOKER STATE). For 
example, Model IV reveals that in a TOBAC STATE, a lame duck raises STATETAX by 0.95 
cents (at the mean of FEDTAX). Moreover, reputation building appears conditional on 
FEDTAX.21  
Turning now to Table 4 (no controls reported; available upon request), the insights gained 
from the earlier results remain largely intact. Models I-III suggest that reputation building is 
particularly intense in states meeting our most stringent cut-offs for the SMOKER STATE, 
TOBAC STATE and MANUF STATE classifications. All coefficients displayed are significant in 
these models. For example, Model I implies that (at the mean of FEDTAX) a lame duck in a 
SMOKER STATE raises STATETAX by 0.10 cents only, while in a TOBAC STATE she raises this 
tax by 0.34 cents.22 Again, lame duck behavior is consistently conditional on FEDTAX.23 As the 
cut-offs for inclusions are relaxed in Models IV-VIII the significance of some of the coefficients 
disappears. This may be due to less intense reputation building on average as the number of 
states rises (and thus the relative importance of tobacco falls). We also find that in Models IV-
VIII the TOBAC STATE and MANUF STATE coefficients tend to be significant more frequently 
that the SMOKER STATE coefficients. This indicates that lobbying by agricultural tobacco and 
by cigarette manufacturing may be relatively more important political pressure than are smoking 
voters. 
V. Conclusion 
 This paper provides evidence that state governors engage in reputation building strategies 
in the area of cigarette taxation, and that these strategies are focused on winning the approval 
among smoking voters, and in particular the agricultural tobacco lobby and the tobacco 
                                                
21 At one std.dev. below the mean of FEDTAX, e.g., the lame duck raises STATETAX by 2.44 cents in a TOBAC 
STATE, according to Model IV.  
22 Model II suggests a lame duck lowers STATETAX by 0.02 in a SMOKER STATE, while in a MANUF STATE she 
raises it by 0.39 cents (at the mean of FEDTAX).  
23 Note, however, that the six states each categorized as TOBAC STATE and MANUF STATE in Model III are 
identical, except one pair. Thus, some caution should be shown in the interpretation of Model III. 
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manufacturing lobby groups. Moreover, such reputation-building is conditional on the federal 
cigarette tax. With a lower real federal cigarette tax in place, lame ducks are more prone to raise 
the state tax.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Term Limit Legislation for Governors by State (1975-2000) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
States with no term limits (13 states): CT, ID, IL, IA, MA,a MN, NH, NY, ND, TX, VT, WA,b  
 WI 
 
States limiting governors to one term in office: VA 
 
States limiting governors to two terms in office (17 states):  AL, DE, FL, KS, LA, MD, ME, MO,  
 NE, NJ, NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SD, WV 
 
State law changed from no term limit to a three-term limit: UT (1994) 
 
State law changed from no term limit to a two-term limit (8 states): AZ (1992), AR (1992), CA  
 (1990), CO (1990), MI (1992), MT (1992), RI (1994), WY (1992) 
 
State law changed from a one-term limit to a two-term limit (8 states): GA (1976), IN (1972),  
 KY (1992), NM (1991), MS (1986), NC (1977), SC (1980), TN (1978) 
Source: List and Sturm (2006). 
Notes: Year of term limit change in brackets. 
a. Term limits were enacted in 1994, but in 1997 the MA Supreme Court ruled them 
unconstitutional. 
b. Two-term term limits were enacted in 1992, but in 1998 the WA Supreme Court ruled 
them unconstitutional. 
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Table A2. Cutoff Values for the Classification as SMOKER STATE, TOBAC STATE and 
MANUF STATE  
SMOKER STATE 
Smokers’ Share of 
Population 
Number of 
States States 
26.36% 7 States IN, KY, MO, NV, OH, TN, WV 
26% or greater 10 States AR, IN, KY, MI, MO, NV, NC, OH, TN, WV 
25% or greater 13 States AR, DE, IN, KY, MI, MO, NV, NC, OH, OK, SC, TN, WV 
TOBAC STATE 
Agric. Tobacco Prod. 
in Pounds/Real GSP 
Number of 
States States 
500lbs/RGSP ($Mn) 6 States GA, KY, NC, SC, TN, VA 
50lbs/RGSP ($Mn) 13 States FL, GA, IN, KY, MD, NC, OH, PA, SC, TN, VA, WV, WI 
>0lbs/RGSP ($Mn) 17 States AL, CT, FL, GA, IN, KY, MD, MA, MO, NC, OH, PA, SC, TN, 
VA, WV, WI 
MANUF STATE 
Share of Tobacco 
Manuf. in Real GSP 
Number of 
States States 
0.1% of RGSP 6 States GA, KY, NY, NC, TN, VA 
0.01% of RGSP 13 States AL, CT, FL, GA, IL, KY, NY, NC, PA, SC, TN, VA, WV 
>0% of RGSP 18 States AL, CA, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN, KY, MO, NJ, NY, NC, PA, SC, TN, 
TX, VA, WV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25
Figure 1: Real Federal Cigarette Tax Rates and State Cigarette Tax Rates 
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Note: Fig. 1 includes the three states with the greatest increases (CA, NY, WA) and the three states with 
the largest declines (KY, NC, VA).  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variables Definition Source Obs Mean Min Max 
STATETAX  
State excise tax (1983 centsUS) 
Orzechowski and 
Walker (2003) 1222 18.11 1.45 64.46 
FEDTAX  
Federal tax (1983 centsUS) 
Orzechowski and 
Walker (2003) 1222 13.94 8.29 19.75 
LAMEDUCK List and Sturm (2006) 1222 0.26 0 1 
NatlGDP 
national real GDP (1983 bn $US) 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce  1222 3858 2472 5700 
NatlUNEMPLOY 
national unemployment rate 
U.S. Census Bureau  
 1222 6.45 4 9.5 
POPULATION 
State population 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce  1222 5143911 376000 3.40x10
7 
INCOME 
personal income/capita (1983 $US) 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce  1222 12944 7628 24097 
StateUNEMPLOY 
State unemployment rate 
U.S. Department of 
Labor  1222 6.25 2.2 18 
CHILD 
portion of population age 5–17 U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.20 0.16 0.27 
OVER65 
Portion of population over 65 U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.12 0.7 0.19 
TOBACCO INCOME 
tobacco production (lbs)/$US of state 
income 
USDA  1222 0.002 0 0.10 
GAS  
daily production/$US of state income 
U.S. Department of 
Energy  1222 0.008 0 0.32 
GRANTS 
federal grants/capita (1983 $US) U.S. Census Bureau  1222 499 231 1192 
INCOME TAX 
federal income tax divided by adjusted 
gross income 
U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.14 0.06 0.19 
DEMOGOV 
dummy = 1, if the governor is a Democrat 
National Governors 
Association  1222 0.55 0 1 
DEMOSENATE  
proportion of Democrats in State Senate  U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.59 0.09 1 
DEMOHOUSE  
proportion of Democrats in State House  U.S. Census Bureau  1222 0.585 0.13 1 
BEER TAX 
State excise tax per gallon (1983 $US) 
World Tax Data Base 
(2006) 1196 0.17 0.01 1.43 
DEFICIT-1 
state budget deficit (% of real GSP)  
lagged 1 year 
U.S. Census Bureau 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
1222 8.85 -17.05 55.92 
      
Table 2. Fixed Effect Estimations: SMOKER STATE, TOBAC STATE, and MANUF STATE Models I 
Model 
 
I 
SMOKER  
STATE 
II 
SMOKER  
STATE 
III 
SMOKER  
STATE
IV 
TOBAC  
STATE 
V 
TOBAC  
STATE
VI 
TOBAC 
STATE
VII 
MANUF  
STATE 
VIII 
MANUF  
STATE
IX 
MANUF  
STATE
 
LAMEDUCK 
 
4.90*** 
(2.92) 
 
5.61*** 
(4.53) 
 
5.11***
(3.67) 
 
2.03 
(1.15) 
 
2.95** 
(1.99) 
 
5.38*** 
(3.27) 
 
3.36 
(1.46) 
 
3.45* 
(1.76) 
 
5.08*** 
(2.97) 
FEDTAX 0.32*** (2.77) 
0.32*** 
(2.78) 
0.32*** 
(2.75) 
0.32*** 
(2.76) 
0.31*** 
(2.73) 
0.32*** 
(2.79) 
0.32*** 
(2.77) 
0.32*** 
(2.80) 
0.32*** 
(2.72) 
 
FEDTAX× 
 LAMEDUCK 
-0.32** 
(2.50) 
-0.39*** 
(4.14) 
-0.34***
(3.10) 
-0.18 
(1.46) 
-0.24** 
(2.31) 
-0.37***
(2.86) 
-0.24 
(1.46) 
-0.25* 
(1.76) 
-0.35** 
(2.59) 
 
LAMEDUCK× 
 SMOKER STATE 
 
3.74* 
(1.76) 
 
2.55* 
(1.90) 
 
5.02** 
(2.08) 
 
      
 
FEDTAX× 
  LAMEDUCK× 
  SMOKER STATE 
-0.29* 
(1.94) 
-0.16* 
(1.76) 
-0.38** 
(2.10)       
 
LAMEDUCK× 
 TOBAC STATE 
   7.79*** (3.36) 
7.07*** 
(3.69) 
4.00 
(1.66)    
 
FEDTAX× 
  LAMEDUCK× 
  TOBAC STATE 
   -0.47*** (3.10) 
-0.41*** 
(3.50) 
-0.29 
(1.60)    
 
LAMEDUCK× 
 MANUF STATE 
      5.86* (1.77) 
8.01** 
(2.40) 
4.63* 
(1.91) 
 
FEDTAX× 
  LAMEDUCK× 
  MANUF STATE 
      -0.40* (1.85) 
-0.52** 
(2.36) 
-0.34* 
(1.84) 
 
Classification 
“SMOKER 
STATE” 
13  
States 
 
10  
States 
 
7  
States 
 
      
Classification 
“TOBAC STATE”    
17 
States 
 
13 
States 
 
    6 
States 
 
   
Classification 
“MANUF STATE”       
18  
States 
13  
States 
6  
States 
Standard 
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes YES YES 
Observations 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 
Joint Signif. Test 8.53 [0.00] 
7.88 
[0.00] 
8.98 
[0.00] 
9.57 
[0.00] 
10.09 
[0.00] 
10.74 
[0.00] 
8.85 
[0.00] 
10.23 
[0.00] 
10.94 
[0.00] 
Notes: Fixed–effect estimations with robust standard errors for years 1975–2000, except for Model I, V and VI, where z-statistics is 
reported). The dependent variable is STATETAX. ***(**)[*] indicates significant at the 1(5)[10]% level, respectively. The joint significance test 
is for all variables which include LAMEDUCK. Standard controls included in all models (results available upon request) are: DEMOGOV, 
DEMOSENATE,DEMOHOUSE, NatlGDP, NatlUNEMPLOY, POPULATION, INCOME, StateUNEMPLOY, CHILD, OVER65, TOBACCO 
INCOME, GAS, GRANTS, INCOME TAX, square terms for POPULATION and INCOME, a constant, a time trend and its square.  
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Table 3. Fixed Effect Estimations: Robustness Analysis I  
Model 
I 
 
IV 
 
 
II 
 
LAG 
FEDTAX
 
III 
 
NO T. 
LIMIT 
CHNGE 
IV 
 
ONLY T.
LIMIT 
STATES 
V 
 
HORIZ. 
INTER 
ACTION 
VI 
 
LDV 
 
 
VII 
 
BEER 
TAX 
 
VIII 
 
STATE 
DEFICIT 
 
 SMOKER STATE (Cutoff: 10 States) 
LAMEDUCK 17.70** (2.12) 
5.44*** 
(2.82) 
3.83** 
(2.29) 
5.20*** 
(3.71) 
4.14* 
(1.82) 
3.62*** 
(3.60) 
5.22*** 
(4.29) 
5.62*** 
(4.62) 
FEDTAX 0.73*** (5.81) 
0.48*** 
(4.18) 
0.24** 
(2.35) 
0.33*** 
(2.64) 
0.15 
(1.44) 
0.12** 
(2.14) 
0.33*** 
(2.93) 
0.33*** 
(2.93)  
FEDTAX × LAMEDUCK -1.24** (-2.10) 
-0.39*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.20** 
(-2.03) 
-0.37*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.31* 
(-1.92) 
-0.24*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.37*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.39*** 
(-4.25)  
 
LAMEDUCK ×  
  SMOKER STATE 
2.79 
(0.26) 
4.33** 
(2.40) 
2.22 
(0.72) 
1.91 
(1.48) 
2.24 
(0.76) 
-0.81 
(-0.86) 
3.86*** 
(2.70) 
2.88** 
(1.99)  
 
FEDTAX × LAMEDUCK    
× SMOKER STATE 
-0.19 
(-0.24) 
-0.29** 
(-2.18) 
-0.35* 
(-1.75) 
-0.11 
(-1.28) 
-0.07 
(-0.32) 
0.04 
(0.63) 
-0.24** 
(-2.45) 
-0.19* 
(-1.95) 
 
Joint Signif. Test 13.95 [0.00] 
4.84 
[0.00] 
5.70 
[0.00] 
5.86 
[0.00] 
14.11 
[0.01] 
15.69 
[0.00] 
8.02 
[0.00] 
8.10 
[0.00] 
 TOBAC STATE (Cutoff: 13 States)  
LAMEDUCK 11.05 (1.31) 
4.76*** 
(2.94) 
2.80 
(1.61) 
2.12 
(1.22) 
0.99 
(0.42) 
2.28** 
(2.29) 
2.81* 
(1.81) 
3.01** 
(2.10)  
FEDTAX 0.75*** (5.98) 
0.47*** 
(4.10) 
0.28** 
(2.55) 
0.32** 
(2.57) 
0.15 
(1.49) 
0.12** 
(2.15) 
0.32*** 
(2.86) 
0.32*** 
(2.88)  
FEDTAX × LAMEDUCK -0.81 (-1.35) 
-0.37*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.21** 
(-1.98) 
-0.19 
(-1.52) 
-0.08 
(-0.45) 
-0.18** 
(-2.34) 
-0.24** 
(-2.22) 
-0.25** 
(-2.47)  
 
LAMEDUCK ×  
  TOBAC STATE 
15.33 
(1.28) 
4.13*** 
(3.00) 
3.08 
(1.36) 
7.33*** 
(3.37) 
9.64*** 
(3.41) 
1.96** 
(2.08) 
7.57*** 
(3.82) 
7.20*** 
(3.77)  
 
FEDTAX × LAMEDUCK  
× TOBAC STATE 
-1.00 
(-1.18) 
-0.21** 
(-1.97) 
-0.13 
(-0.83) 
-0.42*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.65*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.09 
(-1.45) 
-0.44*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.41*** 
(-3.63) 
Joint Signif. Test 15.82 [0.00] 
4.09 
[0.00] 
4.48 
[0.00] 
8.24 
[0.00] 
25.59 
[0.00] 
20.08 
[0.00] 
10.50 
[0.00] 
10.02 
[0.00] 
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   MANUF STATE (Cutoff: 13 States)  
LAMEDUCK 6.12 (0.81) 
5.51*** 
(2.84) 
1.32 
(0.64) 
2.79 
(1.25) 
2.98 
(1.36) 
2.92*** 
(2.83) 
3.65* 
(1.84) 
3.55* 
(1.85)  
FEDTAX 0.81*** (6.03) 
0.47*** 
(4.11) 
0.27*** 
(2.60) 
0.32*** 
(2.66) 
0.15 
(1.45) 
0.12** 
(2.19) 
0.32*** 
(2.94) 
0.32*** 
(2.95)  
FEDTAX × LAMEDUCK -0.45 (-0.83) 
-0.40*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.10 
(-0.76) 
-0.21 
(-1.28) 
-0.20 
(-1.26) 
-0.20*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.26* 
(-1.84) 
-0.26* 
(-1.86)  
 
LAMEDUCK ×  
  MANUF STATE 
38.81*** 
(2.22) 
3.27*** 
(2.50) 
10.04** 
(2.18) 
7.90** 
(2.23) 
6.59** 
(2.20) 
0.97 
(1.08) 
7.81** 
(2.38) 
8.10** 
(2.43)  
 
FEDTAX × LAMEDUCK 
× MANUF STATE 
-2.69*** 
(-2.20) 
-0.20* 
(-1.87) 
-0.63** 
(-2.35) 
-0.51** 
(-2.16) 
-0.45** 
(-2.08) 
-0.06 
(-1.06) 
-0.52** 
(-2.36) 
-0.53** 
(-2.40) 
 Joint Signif. Test 9.80 [0.04] 
4.09 
[0.01] 
5.57 
[0.00] 
9.04 
[0.00] 
15.65 
[0.00] 
22.22 
[0.00] 
10.68 
[0.00] 
10.16 
[0.00] 
Observations 1222 1222 754 936 1170 1128 1196 1222 
Notes: Fixed–effect estimations with robust standard errors for years 1975–2000, except for Model I, V and VI, where 
z-statistics is reported). The dependent variable is STATETAX. ***(**)[*] indicates significant at the 1(5)[10]% level, 
respectively. The joint significance test is for all variables which include LAMEDUCK. Standard controls included in 
all models (results available upon request) are: DEMOGOV, DEMOSENATE,DEMOHOUSE, NatlGDP, 
NatlUNEMPLOY, POPULATION, INCOME, StateUNEMPLOY, CHILD, OVER65, TOBACCO INCOME, GAS, 
GRANTS, INCOME TAX, square terms for POPULATION and INCOME, a constant, a time trend and its square.  
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Table 4. Fixed Effect Estimations with SMOKER STATE, TOBAC STATE and MANUF STATE:  Robustness Analysis II 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
LAMEDUCK 3.96** (2.31) 
3.83** 
(2.28) 
5.36*** 
(3.26) 
3.08** 
(2.13) 
3.12* 
(1.73) 
2.94* 
(1.92) 
1.88 
(0.97) 
2.50 
(1.04) 
1.88 
(0.87) 
FEDTAX 0.32*** (2.79) 
0.32*** 
(2.78) 
0.32*** 
(2.77) 
0.31** 
(2.73) 
0.32*** 
(2.85) 
0.32*** 
(2.75) 
0.31*** 
(2.74) 
0.32*** 
(2.78) 
0.31*** 
(2.71) 
FEDTAX×LAMEDUCK -0.27** (-2.08) 
-0.26** 
(-2.07) 
-0.37*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.25** 
(2.42) 
-0.23* 
(-1.83) 
-0.24** 
(-2.24) 
-0.15 
(-1.07) 
-0.17 
(-0.99) 
-0.16 
(-1.08) 
LAMEDUCK× 
   SMOKER STATE 
5.00** 
(2.37) 
4.93** 
(2.38)  
-0.70 
(0.51) 
0.97 
(0.65)  
0.67 
(0.35) 
2.76 
(1.46)  
FEDTAX× LAMEDUCK× 
   SMOKER STATE 
-0.38** 
(-2.43) 
-0.37** 
(-2.45)  
0.02 
(0.23) 
-0.05 
(-0.47)  
-0.12 
(-0.87) 
-0.23* 
(-1.80)  
LAMEDUCK× 
   TOBAC STATE 
3.77** 
(2.01)  
-11.21*** 
(-3.15) 
7.38*** 
(3.23)  
0.97 
(0.21) 
7.55*** 
(3.29)  
6.19** 
(2.36) 
FEDTAX× LAMEDUCK× 
   TOBAC STATE 
-0.26* 
(-1.96)  
-0.76*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.42*** 
(3.23)  
0.06 
(0.17) 
-0.43*** 
(-3.15)  
-0.30 
(-1.63) 
LAMEDUCK× 
   MANUF STATE  
4.37** 
(2.31) 
15.65*** 
(3.48)  
7.86** 
(2.28) 
7.73 
(1.15)  
5.15 
(1.63) 
1.88 
(0.46) 
FEDTAX× LAMEDUCK× 
   MANUF STATE  
-0.30** 
(-2.29) 
-1.08*** 
(-3.49)  
-0.51** 
(-2.22) 
-0.59 
(-1.22)  
-0.34* 
(-1.70) 
-0.21 
(-0.75) 
Classification 
“SMOKER STATE” 
7 
States 
7 
States  
10 
States 
10 
States  
13 
States 
13 
States  
Classification 
“TOBAC STATE” 
6 
States  
6 
States 
13 
States  
13 
States 
17 
States  
17 
States 
Classification 
“MANUF STATE”  
6 
States 
6 
States  
13 
States 
13 
States  
18 
States 
18 
States 
Standard Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES   
Observations 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 1222 
Joint Signif. Test 7.81 [0.00] 
8.03 
[0.00] 
7.95 
[0.00] 
6.80 
[0.00] 
7.25 
[0.00] 
7.28 
[0.00] 
6.40 
[0.00] 
5.80 
[0.00] 
7.44 
[0.00] 
Notes: Fixed–effect estimations with robust standard errors for years 1975–2000. The dependent variable is STATETAX. All models include a 
constant, and square terms for POPULATION and INCOME, a time trend, and its square. ***(**)[*] indicates significant at the 1(5)[10]% level, 
respectively. Joint significant test is an F-test for all variables involving LAMEDUCK. Table A2 provides the classification of states. 
